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Ammunition is an essential resource for the im-plementation of a national defense and security policy. National ammunition stockpiles—regardless 
of their functional classification—can pose risks to national 
security and public safety.1 Poor accounting and inadequate 
physical security of storage facilities can lead to the diver-
sion of ammunition from the national stockpile to terrorists, 
criminals, and other armed groups, increasing insecurity and 
instability. Furthermore, the deterioration of munition com-
ponents can contribute to unplanned explosions at munitions 
sites (UEMS), which can have significant negative socio- 
economic and political consequences for the public and nation-
al governments.2 Comprehensive ammunition management 
ensures that the right types and quantities of ammunition are 
available, at the right time, to support national strategic and 
operational needs. It is also seen as the only long-term strat-
egy for preventing the excessive accumulation of surplus and 
for mitigating the safety and security risks inherent to all am-
munition stockpiles.3 Such an approach takes into account the 
technical aspects of ammunition management that are often 
covered by stockpile management efforts, as well as the relat-
ed structural and political dynamics. This results in planning 
challenges and has significant budgetary implications for gov-
ernments. A systems-based approach to the life-cycle man-
agement of ammunition (LCMA), and a long-term strategy to 
execute it, can help a state to address these challenges by min-
imizing the probability of excessive surplus accumulation and 
mitigating diversion and UEMS risks while meeting national 
strategic and operational needs.
This article provides an overview of the LCMA approach. 
Drawing on previous Small Arms Survey work such as 
A Practical Guide to LCMA Handbook and the case study, 
“LCMA: Lessons Learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” this 
article provides an abridged version of the LCMA model and 
the lessons learned from efforts to establish LCMA in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH).4–6 Perhaps more importantly, it also 
invites policy-practitioners to think creatively about ammuni-
tion management and argues that national ownership creates 
an enabling environment that supports the effective function-
ing of LCMA. The political and structural aspects of ammu-
nition management determine the efficiency of LCMA-related 
processes and activities: rather than being opposing concepts, 
the political dynamics and technical aspects of ammunition 
management are tightly intertwined.
What Is LCMA?  
Ensuring effective management of ammunition requires a 
comprehensive approach that allows states to meet their long-
term strategic and operational requirements and ensure safe 
and secure ammunition stockpiles. LCMA is an example of 
such an approach and recognizes the importance of adequate 
technical capabilities but also emphasizes the political dimen-
sion of managing ammunition across its life cycle: planning, 
procurement, stockpile management, and disposal. This sec-
tion provides an overview of the safety and security implica-
tions of improper stockpile management before introducing 
the concept of LCMA. 
UEMS, Diversion, and Surplus Accumulation
Despite growing awareness, in many states ineffective man-
agement of ammunition stockpiles continues to be the norm. 
All ammunition stockpiles pose a risk of UEMS and diversion 
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Figure 1. Number of UEMS incidents per year, 1979–2018. (Data available until end of February 2018.)
Figure courtesy of Small Arms Survey (n.d.).
along all points of the national stockpile chain: manufacture, 
storage, employment, and disposal. According to the Small 
Arms Survey’s UEMS Database, about 580 UEMS occurred 
in more than 100 countries between 1979 and February 2018, 
often with grave social, economic, and political consequenc-
es (see Figure 1).7 In addition to fueling crime and terrorism, 
ammunition that is diverted from state stockpiles can affect 
the duration and intensity of armed conflicts.8 
States view conventional ammunition stockpiles as assets 
rather than liabilities and thus have a tendency to retain am-
munition stockpiles in excess of strategic and operation-
al requirements. In some contexts, together with ineffective 
stockpile management practices, this leads to the accumula-
tion of unsafe, unserviceable, and obsolete surpluses in the 
national stockpile. The result is a build-up of ammunition and 
an increase in safety and security risks.9 Surplus accumula-
tion also leads to a considerable financial burden for states in 
terms of operational, maintenance, and destruction costs.10 
Historically, national authorities, international donors, and 
practitioners have adopted technical approaches for dealing 
with surplus accumulation and mitigating the risk of UEMS 
and diversion. Often under the heading of physical securi-
ty and stockpile management (PSSM), the aim is to improve 
stockpile management practices by bringing them in line with 
international best practices, such as the measures elaborated in 
the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).11 
Technical approaches have a number of benefits: they can be 
cost-effective and help to mitigate the risk of UEMS, diversion, 
and surplus accumulation at storage locations. 
One of the main shortcomings of the technical approach is 
its lack of sustainability. Despite the increase in safety and 
security, most technical programs and initiatives to reduce 
ammunition-related risks are not usually designed or imple-
mented in a way that would address the systematic failures 
in stockpile management that lead to UEMS, diversion, and 
excessive surplus accumulation. A key challenge faced by na-
tional authorities, donors, and implementing organizations is 
to deliver appropriate technical programs to respond to inci-
dents of UEMS and diversion, as well as to address the under-
lying, higher-level causes of these events. The effectiveness of 
technical initiatives cannot be guaranteed without addressing 
systemic shortcomings. International guidelines emphasize 
that states take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance in en-
suring the safety and security of stockpiles to the highest pos-
sible standards.12 Effectively addressing both is contingent on 
adopting a comprehensive approach to ammunition manage-
ment, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey’s LCMA model. 
LCMA: A Comprehensive Means of  
Ammunition Management 
LCMA comprises a comprehensive set of integrated pro-
cesses and activities that ensure sustainable and cost- 
effective management of ammunition, delivering a safe and 
secure stockpile that meets national strategic and operation-
al needs. The LCMA approach recognizes the importance of 
adequate technical capabilities but also emphasizes the polit-
ical dimension of managing ammunition across its life cycle. 
It requires that state actors at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels work together on multiple ammunition-related 
aspects to ensure cost-effective management of the entire na-
tional stockpile.
The LMCA model draws on current practices among a 
number of states that participate in NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program as well as other NATO partners that 
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implement comprehensive ammunition management sys-
tems.13 These states have well-established militaries and a 
long history of ammunition management. While national 
approaches may differ, one feature is central to all: the ef-
fectiveness of LCMA systems in these states is ensured by a 
high degree of national ownership. This feature guarantees 
an enabling environment, a prerequisite for sustainable am-
munition management. 
LCMA Model
By analyzing the various LCMA systems observed in the 
NATO and PfP states, the Small Arms Survey developed a gen-
eral LCMA model (Figure 2). It is composed of one structural 
element and four functional elements. To be effective, all ele-
ments must work together as an integrated and efficient whole. 
The structural element, which involves national ownership 
and its associated enabling conditions, supports the effective 
and efficient management of ammunition across the life cycle 
to ensure the integrity and sustainability of the LCMA sys-
tem. Often recognized as a key aspect of LCMA, the structur-
al aspects of ammunition management are rarely elaborated 
in detail by international guidelines. The LCMA model also 
consists of four functional elements: planning, procurement, 
stockpile management, and disposal, which ensure the safety, 
security, and cost-effectiveness of ammunition stockpiles. The 
four functional elements draw and, where necessary, elabo-
rate on the best practices for stockpile management accord-
ing to the IATG. 
Representations of LCMA models 
tend to be linear depictions that mask 
the degree of interaction and sequenc-
ing among the functional elements of 
the system. Such depictions also tend to 
omit the key role of national ownership, 
which complements and supports the 
functional elements and is critical to the 
overall integrity of an LCMA system. 
In contrast, Figure 2 highlights the in-
terrelationships among the elements. It 
also stresses the importance of the two 
crucial aspects of ammunition manage-
ment: the political, which is the struc-
tural element necessary for effectiveness 
of the functional elements; and the tech-
nical, which is the functional elements 
necessary for the management of am-
munition across its life cycle. 
Milestones 
Throughout an LCMA system, decisions are made in order to 
manage the national stockpile and mitigate the risk of UEMS 
and diversion. Milestones are points in the life cycle where the 
most critical decisions are made regarding transition across 
the functional elements of LCMA and their related processes 
and activities.14 There are a number of milestones within any 
LCMA system. Examples include:
 » Planning to procurement: involves the development 
and approval of strategic plans and budgets for the ac-
quisition and management of types and quantities of 
ammunition necessary for achieving defense goals and 
operational requirements.
 » Procurement to stockpile management: involves the 
procurement of ammunition based on confirmation 
that the items being acquired are safe and suitable for 
service (also known as an S3 process).
 » Stockpile management to disposal: involves the ap-
proval of disposal of ammunition following a national 
disposal review.
 » Disposal to planning: involves the certification or con-
firmation of disposal activities.
Prerequisites for Implementing LCMA Systems
An enabling environment is a prerequisite for sustainable 
ammunition management. It allows for long-term policies and 
plans to become targeted, integrated, and coordinated pro-
grams aimed at effectively managing the national stockpile 
Figure 2. The Small Arms Survey’s LCMA Model. 
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.15
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and mitigating the risks posed by the ammunition. There is 
agreement, both within and outside the U.N. system, that a 
high degree of national ownership is necessary for sustainable 
ammunition management.16 Despite the recognition that na-
tional ownership matters, there is little guidance on what it 
means in practice. This section provides an overview of the 
concept of national ownership before discussing the enabling 
conditions that foster it and support effective implementation 
of LCMA. 
National Ownership for 
Ammunition Management
At its core, national ownership is grounded in the premise 
that states need to take responsibility for ammunition man-
agement and be actively engaged in ensuring the safety and 
security of their stockpiles. A state demonstrates national 
ownership when national actors—including relevant politi-
cal decision-makers, armed forces planning and logistics staff, 
and procurement authorities—have defined and active roles 
in designing, implementing, and monitoring all processes and 
activities across the ammunition life cycle, such as planning, 
procurement, stockpile management, and disposal.
The IATG state that “the primary responsibility for conven-
tional ammunition stockpile management shall rest with the 
Government of the state holding the ammunition.”17 It follows 
that national ownership is not simply about political buy-in 
for ammunition management but also about taking respon-
sibility for setting up and maintaining an LCMA system by: 
 » Establishing a set of effective life-cycle and enabling 
processes that allow them to make milestone-relevant 
decisions and to plan and implement programs for each 
functional element of LCMA.18,19
 » Providing national financial resources for the system 
to cover the cost of procurement and post-acquisition 
costs, such as those associated with storage, surveillance, 
transportation, maintenance, security, and disposal.
 » Facilitating the establishment of the enabling condi-
tions necessary for supporting the effective manage-
ment of ammunition over its life cycle.
Enabling Conditions for LCMA 
There is a dynamic relationship between national ownership 
and the enabling conditions that make LCMA possible. In 
turn, these conditions foster national ownership for ammuni-
tion management and ensure the sustainability of the LCMA 
system as a whole. They include a normative framework, an 
organizational framework, infrastructure and equipment, 
and human resources.
The concept of enabling conditions is inherent in U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from 
the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles 
in surplus” (2017), which recognizes “the importance of ap-
propriate national ammunition management structures and 
procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doc-
trine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management 
and finances, and infrastructure in order to ensure sustain-
ability in ammunition management.”20 The rest of this section 
presents the four enabling conditions in more detail.
Normative Framework 
An LCMA system needs to be anchored in and informed by a 
normative framework that provides guidance on ammunition 
management at different operational levels. The development 
of an appropriate framework is a national responsibility and 
is based on national needs and priorities. For states without a 
normative framework in place, the IATG offer concrete guid-
ance and tools for ammunition safety and security, as well as 
a model for effective stockpile management. They also provide 
advice on developing technical directives for ammunition 
management and on the roles and competencies of ammuni-
tion specialists.21  
Organizational Framework 
National ownership for ammunition management calls for 
context-specific organizational frameworks (i.e., relevant insti-
tutional and organizational structures that are led and staffed 
by national personnel) and allows for coordination and over-
sight of ammunition management processes and activities, and 
ensures efficient implementation. Establishing a framework in-
volves meeting a number of preconditions, including: 
 » A high level of institutional and organizational devel-
opment. An LCMA system demands a high level of in-
stitutional and organizational development, with clearly 
defined tasks, competencies, and responsibilities. 
 » A high level of flexibility. The organizational structure 
must also be flexible enough to ensure that there is in-
formation exchange, coordination, and oversight among 
relevant stakeholders, both international and national.
Infrastructure and Equipment 
Infrastructure and equipment are essential to support the 
implementation of LCMA. A state cannot claim to have the 
capacity to ensure the safety and security of its stockpiles or 
the disposal of surplus without them. For this reason, the last 
decade has seen a considerable increase in the number and 
scale of international assistance programs related to capacity 
4
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss2/2
9ISSUE 22.2 @ AUGUST 2018
development.22 Since 2012, the international community has 
coordinated its efforts to provide infrastructure upgrades to 
strategic ammunition (and weapon) storage. Similar efforts 
have also been seen in Mali, where the international com-
munity has focused on improving physical security infra-
structure in order to prevent weapons and ammunition from 
getting into the hands of insurgent groups.23
Human Resources 
The implementation and sustainability of an LCMA system 
depends on the availability of adequately trained personnel 
at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and the ex-
istence of effective personnel management systems. Training 
on basic stockpile management activities—such as cleaning, 
storehouse maintenance and organization, inspection and 
surveillance of ammunition, inventory management, and ac-
counting—can help to reduce the probability of UEMS and 
diversion. In addition, training is key in fostering national 
ownership and is most effective when it is transferred and in-
tegrated into a recipient state’s institutions.  
Functional Elements of an LCMA System 
There are four functional elements of the LCMA model that 
relate to the different stages of the ammunition life cycle: 
planning, procurement, stockpile management, and disposal. 
The elements must be managed in order to ensure that they 
operate in a coordinated manner and that the risk of UEMS 
and diversion is kept to a minimum. Each functional element 
is summarized below. 
Planning
Planning is essential to the overall management of ammuni-
tion. An LCMA system must be thoroughly planned from the 
outset, with dedicated resources and procedures put in place 
in advance of any new acquisitions or other alterations to the 
system. Direction is provided by a state’s national defense 
policy, which is translated into a comprehensive, long-term 
defense strategy that defines the scope of LCMA planning 
(Figure 3). Consequently, a primary milestone of the planning 
element is the development of a cohesive national ammuni-
tion stockpile plan that meets the long-term defense planning 
goals.
The LCMA planning begins by defining the nation’s am-
munition requirements and continues through the develop-
ment of integrated programs. It is incumbent on planners 
to understand all of the downstream ramifications of their 
stockpile-related decisions. For this to take place, an informa-
tion management system must be in place to ensure oversight 
is maintained over the entire system. An information man-
agement system also allows planners to gather essential in-
formation for the development of element-specific programs, 
which turn identified needs into achievable outputs given fi-
nancial and human resource constraints.24 
Procurement 
An effective procurement process delivers ammunition that 
is suitable for the implementation of the national defense pol-
icy in a safe and secure manner.25 While the planning element 
of the LCMA model determines the general parameters for the 
quantity and type of ammunition to be procured, the procure-
ment element begins with the approval of ammunition for ac-
quisition and concludes with its entry into service.
Even before an order is placed, a limited amount of ammu-
nition is usually acquired for testing (i.e., demonstration and 
evaluation) purposes to determine the safety and suitability for 
service of the ammunition.26 Once ammunition is deemed suit-
able for service, it can be acquired either from producers lo-
cated within their national territory or, more commonly, from 
commercial suppliers in other states. States import new and 
surplus ammunition via commercial sales, government-to-
government sales, or gifts. The import of surplus ammunition 
is cost-effective if it is in good condition.27 However, purchas-
ing from old stockpiles can lead to “controversial quality con-
trol, dubious traceability issues, and procurement fraud.”28  
Procurement systems are expected to adhere to good gov-
ernance principles and include robust anti-corruption pro-
visions. Regardless of the mode of acquisition, states manage 
the safety and security of ammunition during the acquisition 
process, with a focus on ensuring state control and oversight, 
comprehensive registration and record-keeping, and safe 
and secure transportation.29 States also develop laws, regula-
tions, and administrative procedures to control and regulate 
the import, export, transit or transshipment, and brokering 
of military items and technologies, including ammunition. 
Recording each stage of the acquisition process and of the am-
munition’s entry into service is essential to ensuring the safety 
and security of the ammunition.30 This is particularly true at 
moments when the ammunition is susceptible to theft, loss, or 
an unplanned explosion.
Stockpile Management 
In order to meet operational and strategic requirements, as 
well as to ensure the safety and security of stored items, it is 
important to emplace effective stockpile management poli-
cies and practices. Stockpile management begins when am-
munition enters the stockpile and ends when it leaves, be it 
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through issuance (for training or operations), consumption 
(ammunition spent), or disposal (through exports or demil-
itarization). With many complex and interrelated processes 
and activities, stockpile management requires continuous 
review and assessment to ensure the adequacy of resourc-
es, infrastructure, equipment, and personnel. These review 
processes form the key milestones of the stockpile manage-
ment element. 
The stockpile management element of the Survey’s LCMA 
model is based on the IATG—more specifically, the IATG 
core groups of activities around which all stockpile manage-
ment processes and activities are structured.31 To ensure effec-
tive stockpile management and reduce the risk of unplanned 
explosions and diversion, the core groups interact very close-
ly, with individual activities depending on or influencing 
each other across group boundaries. The six core groups of 
ammunition-based activities are accounting, destruction, 
maintenance, stockpile security, storage, and transport.
Management of the risks inherent to ammunition stor-
age is a fundamental component of stockpile management. 
Adherence to the IATG fulfills many of the requirements of 
an integrated risk management system.32  Figure 4 outlines the 
overarching risk management approach of the IATG, in par-
ticular the relationship between the different components of 
risk management.33  The IATG also offer detailed explanations 
of each component of risk management and techniques for 
stockpile management.34
Disposal 
Disposal is the removal of unsafe, unserviceable, obsolete, 
or excess ammunition from the national stockpile. Until it 
has been physically removed from the stockpile, disposal- 
designated ammunition is treated as part of the national 
stockpile.35 A state’s decision to dispose of ammunition as 
part of a national disposal review is the first step in the pro-
cess, and a number of factors can influence that decision. The 
process ends with the physical removal of disposal-designated 
ammunition from the stockpile as a result of a disposal action. 
A number of milestones are related to disposal and include
 » The decision to dispose of ammunition. 
 » The selection of a disposal method and process in the 
case of demilitarization. 
 » The completion of disposal activities. 
 » The confirmation that ammunition has been disposed 
of properly and in accordance with a disposal decision. 
While historically various disposal methods were avail-
able to a state, there currently are only two internationally- 
accepted disposal methods: exports (sales or donations) and 
demilitarization. Of these two, states tend to prefer export; 
however, international arms and ammunition control efforts 
emphasize demilitarization.36 The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 
establishes legally binding commitments governing the ex-
port, import, transit, transshipment, and brokering of con-
ventional arms and ammunition. A number of technologies 
are potentially available for demilitarization, each one with 
advantages and disadvantages. Although commonly used, 
open burning (OB) and open detonation (OD) are modes of 
disposal that are increasingly discouraged by states due to 
health and environmental concerns.37a 
Age, unclear history, or the existence of internal damage, 
corrosion, and other dangerous conditions (such as exuda-
tion or crystallization) can mean demilitarization causes 
significantly greater risks than those associated with new 
ammunition. Advanced planning is key to fully address-
ing ammunition disposal methodologies and risks, and can 
reduce costs and ensure appropriate equipment and train-
ing for individuals assigned to accomplish safe and effi-
cient disposal and decommissioning tasks. Managing risk 
for demilitarization also requires developing effective mu-
nitions emergency response processes and procedures for 
the decommissioning of contaminated sites, both of which 
require the participation of specially trained individuals. 
National Defense Policy
Long-term defense strategy
LCMA planningDeveloped by the MoD,
approved by the head of
state/national legislature
Developed by chief of
defense/joint chiefs of staff
approved by the MoD
Developed by general
or joint staff, approved by
joint chiefs of staff
Figure 3. Long-term defense planning and LCMA.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6
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LCMA in Context: Lessons Learned from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
Recognizing that a comprehensive approach is best suited to 
address complex ammunition management challenges, this 
section uses the LCMA model presented as a framework for 
analyzing the emergence of an LCMA system in BiH during 
the period 2012–2016. The section stresses the importance of 
focusing on ammunition management as a distinct area of 
concern when considering ammunition, weapons, and explo-
sives (AWE) challenges in post-conflict settings. It highlights 
ten lessons learned from implementing four of the five main 
elements of an effective LCMA system: national ownership, 
planning, stockpile management, and disposal. The fifth ele-
ment has not been implemented, as BiH has not yet made pro-
visions for the procurement of ammunition. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia had serious repercus-
sions for ammunition management in BiH. The onset of con-
flict, in June 1991, combined with a U.N. arms embargo on 
Yugoslavia’s successor states in January 1992, had serious neg-
ative consequences for ammunition management capacities 
and practices.38 The immediate post-conflict period was char-
acterized by efforts to exercise basic control of ammunition 
and weapon stockpiles in BiH instead of developing life-cycle 
management systems for ammunition and weapons.39 
By 2000, the focus had switched toward defense reform, mil-
itary downsizing, and the identification and disposal of sur-
plus weapons and ammunition. Despite the urgency to deal 
with the surplus ammunition, and the establishment of a 
normative framework to do so, competing political interests 
undermined the disposal process (Figure 5). Consequently, 
international pressure for addressing the safety and securi-
ty concerns of the national ammunition stockpile increased 
by the end of the 2000s, paving the way for the develop-
ment of a plan to establish an LCMA system in the country. 
The priority for BiH to date has been to identify and dis-
pose of excessive, unstable, and unsafe ammunition and to 
put in place the planning and management processes that 
will ensure the safety and security of the ammunition that 
the country needs to implement its national defense and 
security strategy.
Lesson 1: National ownership is fundamental for ef-
fective LCMA. The international community substituted for 
a lack of national capacity to manage and dispose of surplus 
ammunition in post-conflict BiH. Since 2012, however, the in-
ternational community has focused on building national ca-
pacity to ensure ownership of the LCMA system. As a result 
of these efforts, high-ranking BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) per-
sonnel, including the minister of defense and chief of defense, 
are now taking the lead in related decision-making and plan-
ning on ammunition as well as ensuring that armed forces 
personnel are sufficiently trained. 
Lesson 2: The coordinated, long-term commitment of 
international partners is essential for the establishment of 
LCMA in a post-conflict setting. Prior to 2013, there was a 
lack of coordination, communication, and information shar-
ing between international and regional organizations, states, 
and NGOs working to address BiH’s ammunition stockpile 
Figure 4. IATG risk management matrix.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6,11, 37b
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challenges.40 To address these issues, all key internation-
al stakeholders committed to providing expertise and re-
sources in a complementary and coordinated way to help the 
BiH MoD and the AFBiH address the challenges posed by 
the AWE stockpile.41 By the end of 2012, thanks to the non- 
paper, the international community had streamlined 
its efforts on how to address BiH’s ammunition stock- 
pile challenges.40
Lesson 3: Implementing effective LCMA in a post- 
conflict setting requires early agreement on overall objec-
tives, specific priorities, and resource requirements. During 
the first quarter of 2013, the international community con-
vened a task force consisting of key international and BiH 
stakeholders to develop an AWE Master Plan that defined the 
desired outcome for addressing AWE challenges as “the trans-
parent disposal of surplus ammunition and weapons and the 
introduction of a sustainable ammunition and weapons life-
cycle management system in BiH.”42 The AWE Master Plan 
provided clarity on the international community’s capacities, 
resources, and potential contributions in addressing BiH’s 
AWE challenges. It also defined the roles and responsibilities 
of the different international actors, the BiH MoD, and the 
AFBiH.43 The AWE Master Plan was endorsed by all relevant 
national and international stakeholders. 
Lesson 4: Sustainable LCMA requires robust organiza-
tional structures and appropriate personnel. 
The AWE Master Plan defined the organizational structure 
required to support the programs and activities for the trans-
parent disposal of surplus ammunition and the implemen-
tation of sustainable LCMA.44 This organizational structure 
ensured effective and efficient coordination of national and 
international activities, confidence among all key stakehold-
ers, and empowered BiH authorities and senior leaders within 
international organizations. 
Moreover, appropriately experienced, skilled, and motivated 
personnel should be placed in key positions to ensure that the 
organizational structure delivers the desired changes. A criti-
cal factor in the case of BiH was the European Union Force 
(EUFOR) commander’s decision to create the position of se-
nior advisor for weapons and ammunition disposal (SAWAD) 
in April 2013. SAWAD can influence decision-making, over-
sees implementation, and ensures the overall coordination of 
Master Plan activities. 
Lesson 5: Successful LCMA rests on a comprehensive in-
ventory of the ammunition stockpile.
It was not until 2012 that a decision was made for BiH to 
conduct a comprehensive inventory—locally referred to as the 
100 per cent inventory—of its ammunition stockpile, create a 
single national ammunition list, and establish a national in-
ventory management system.45 BiH’s limited capacity made it 
difficult to conduct the 100 percent inventory in an effective 
and timely manner.46 Therefore, from 2012 to 2013, AFBiH 
personnel received training in basic ammunition handling, 
testing, storage, LCMA regulations and standard operating 
procedures (SOP), and inventory management.42 The AFBiH 
began the ‘100 percent inventory’ in 2013 MoD, and it is ex-
pected to be finished by the end of 2018. 
Lesson 6: Stockpile safety depends on an assessment of 
the condition of stored ammunition. A key component of ef-
fective LCMA, more specifically of the 100 percent inventory 
referred to previously, is the ability to determine the physi-
cal condition, chemical stability, and hazard classification 
of ammunition in the national stockpile.47 With the support 
of the international community and as part of the 100 per-
cent inventory mentioned in Lesson 5, the BiH MoD decided 
to undertake 
 » A stock-check of the entire ammunition stockpile. 
 » A visual technical inspection of all the ammunition. 
 » A chemical test of the propellant, using quick propellant 
analysis kits (QPAK) provided by the Austrian compo-
nent of the mobile training team (MTT) Project.48 
These additional assessments laid the foundations for the de-
velopment of an ammunition surveillance system in BiH. 
Lesson 7: Adequate resources and capacities are needed 
for a safe and secure ammunition stockpile. Effective stock-
pile management involves the safe and secure storage, trans-
portation, and handling of ammunition.49 In accordance with 
BiH’s Law on Defence and the future operational require-
ments of the AFBiH, OSCE SECUP, and UNDP EXPLODE, 
assistance projects upgraded safety and security standards for 
two prospective ammunition storage sites in BiH: Kula 1 and 
2, and Krupa. The Doboj demilitarization facility was also 
upgraded, because these sites have capacity to house BiH re-
quired ammunition and can be maintained by the AFBiH.50 
These infrastructure upgrades, as well as donations of equip-
ment and training provided by the EUFOR MTT Project 
troop-contributing nations, reflect good coordination be-
tween BiH and its international partners.51 
Lesson 8: Effective and efficient surplus disposal re-
quires adequate normative and institutional frameworks, 
as well as the necessary political will. As noted previously, 
ammunition disposal was a politically sensitive issue during 
the late 2000s. While presidential approval was (and contin-
ues to be) required for any form of disposal, the process for 
authorization is now more efficient, and approval is grant-
ed more quickly than in the past.40 The reduction in the time 
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taken for the presidential approval led to a significant increase 
in the ammunition disposal rate during the period 2015–2016 
(see Figure 5).52 
Despite BiH authorities preferring to export their surplus 
ammunition, demilitarization continues to be the primary 
mode of disposal in the country.52 International stakeholders 
have facilitated the demilitarization and destruction process 
by increasing the capacity and skills of AFBiH personnel and 
employing independent contractors at the TROM Doboj de-
militarization facility and the Glamoc range.51
Lesson 9: Serviceable but surplus ammunition may be 
disposed of through export sales authorized in conformity 
with a country’s international commitments. Prior to 2013, 
international partners and key BiH stakeholders had diver-
gent views regarding the export of surplus ammunition.40 
Stakeholders have come to accept export sales as a valid meth-
od for the disposal of surplus if carried out by national au-
thorities in accordance with international standards, such 
as those of the ATT.54 Several independent assessments have 
concluded that BiH’s arms export control legislation and ad-
ministrative procedures meet such standards.55 The BiH MoD 
has developed administrative guidance for the disposal of 
surplus by export in the 2012 Plan for Resolving Surplus.56
Lesson 10: Serviceable but surplus ammunition can 
also be disposed of through international donation to 
demonstrate support for international partners. The BiH 
president must approve the disposal of surplus through in-
ternational donation after an assessment of political, strate-
gic, and foreign policy considerations. MoD BiH and AFBiH 
representatives have raised two sets of concerns regarding 
such donations. The first is a concern over foregone profit. 
International stakeholders, however, have stressed that dona-
tions help to dispose of ammunition that, while still service-
able, needs to be used quickly.52 Such ammunition is unlikely 
to meet the quality needs of commercial importers. The sec-
ond concern relates to the perceived risk of donated material 
diverting.57 This reflects recent media coverage of the pos-
sible diversion of BiH donations intended for Iraqi govern-
ment forces to non-state armed groups in the Middle East and 
North Africa.58 Yet diversion risks can be reduced via interna-
tional cooperation and good practice.55 At the same time, such 
donations can allow BiH to contribute to efforts to strengthen 
international peace and security.59
Looking Forward
A comprehensive ammunition management approach is re-
quired to ensure that a state’s national stockpile is safe, se-
cure, and operational when needed in order to meet national 
and strategic objectives. The LCMA approach not only allows 
for the mitigation of the risk of UEMS and diversion, but also 
Figure 5. Disposal of ammunition in BiH using open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) and other forms of demilitarization, 2006–
2016.
Figure courtesy of Carapic and Holtom, 2018.
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ensures sustainability of international cooperation and assis-
tance projects. The most recent General Assembly Resolution 
on the “Problems arising from the accumulation of conven-
tional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/RES/70/35) 
stresses the need to develop and implement cooperation and 
assistance programs that ensure sustainability—i.e., are able 
to mitigate the immediate risk of UEMS and diversion and 
have a lasting impact on ammunition management practices 
at the national level. To date, a limited number of internation-
al cooperation and assistance projects have been designed and 
implemented with the intention of ensuring sustainability by 
addressing ammunition management practices across the life 
cycle: from planning to procurement, stockpile management, 
and disposal. The case of BiH is an illustrative example.   
From a practical perspective, this article provides an over-
view of the experience and lessons learned from efforts to es-
tablish and implement a sustainable LCMA system in BiH. 
The BiH experience is useful for other prolonged post-conflict 
environments or those states aiming to establish an LCMA 
system. Establishing and implementing better stockpile man-
agement processes and ultimately LCMA are long-term and 
challenging endeavors. These efforts do not need to be accom-
plished all at one time. Improvements can be incrementally 
structured and implemented based on national priorities, 
available resources, capacities, and capabilities, considering 
the potential efficiencies and benefits that will be derived 
along the way with regards to the national stockpile’s func-
tionality, safety, security, and ability to meet national strategic 
and operational needs. 
See endnotes page 59
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